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OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/10(DOCI)(C)(14 Aug 53)

14 August 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS which are applicable to training at the company/battery level appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

FOR THE ACTING CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

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A. B. Chatham

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A. B. CHATHAM
Lt Col, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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ITEM NO 1

AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS. - Fifth Air Force report on results of a 30-day test in which our fighters and artillery attacked the same target simultaneously is summarized as follows:

a. No friendly aircraft were hit by friendly artillery. A total of 679,075 rounds were fired which included 105-mm and 155-mm howitzer, 155-mm gun and 8-inch howitzer.

b. One aircraft was lost due to enemy flak out of 1816 fighter-bomber close support sorties flown. Former losses were 1 out of 380.

c. Thirteen aircraft were damaged by enemy flak of which only 2 received major damage. This damage rate was 1 out 140, as compared with 1 out of 28 formerly.

Conclusions: Air and artillery operations can be conducted concurrently with maximum effectiveness. The use of field artillery to suppress enemy antiaircraft and ground fire while friendly aircraft are making attacks reduces rather than increases the damage to friendly aircraft. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Nov 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 2

SCOUT DOGS IN KOREA. - As was the case in World War II, scout dogs have proven very popular with combat troops in Korea. These dogs have been used in more than 400 patrols with resultant casualties of four dogs killed, one handler killed, and three handlers wounded in action. Experience has shown these dogs are best suited for use with moving patrols. If kept stationary any length of time, they tend to become restless, will move about, and whine. One major problem resulted from the rotation of dog handlers. By constant association, the dog becomes attached to his handler and may refuse to work for a different one. This handicap has been overcome by requiring the new handler to work with the old one until the dog finally accepts the replacement. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 3

ARTILLERY FLYERS TEST ARMOR VEST ON LOWER BODY. - Flyer's armor vests in excess of authorized allowances were issued to

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pilot-observer teams for the protection of both the upper and lower body. This utilization required two vests per individual instead of the single vest normally issued. Adoption of the second vest was induced by increasingly heavy enemy flak activity. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Nov 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 4

UTILIZATION OF METEOROLOGICAL DATA. - The shortened range effect which occurs during extreme cold weather emphasized the necessity for the utilization of meteorological data in connection with unobserved 4.2-inch mortar fires. Such data had not been previously used in connection with 4.2-inch mortars. As a result, it was necessary to train fire direction center personnel in the use of meteorological data, to obtain range tables so that meteorological effects could be determined, and to obtain thermometers for the determination of powder temperatures. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 5

NAPALM BOMB ATTACK AND DEFENSE. - Sand is an effective extinguisher of fires set by napalm or similar bombs. Stockpiling sand in numerous locations within a unit's position is a desirable precaution in areas where air attack is a possibility. In the incident reported, its availability and prompt use made the difference between a minor and a major loss of personnel and equipment.

If the dropping of napalm bombs is not followed by strafing passes, immediate action to combat or control the fire in accordance with an SOP is effective in reducing losses. The effectiveness of the attack would have been increased had strafing attacks followed the dropping of the napalm bomb. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Dec 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 6

ELECTRIC BLASTING CAPS FOR NAPALM LAND MINES. - It is the policy to emplace napalm land mines electrically to insure greater safety to friendly troops moving through the mined areas, ease of installation, increased safety while emplacing or relocating the mines and greater selectivity and control in firing.

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Although the electric blasting cap is, in this case, one of the important and necessary component parts of the subassembled munition, it is not so listed or stocked for issue with the other components.

The following types of batteries are recommended for use in detonating napalm land mines.

BA 33	*BA 1039/U
BA 39	*BA 2039/U
BA 40	*BA 1040/U
BA 48	*BA 2040/U
BA 70	*BA 1048/U
	*BA 2070/U
	*BA 2048/U
	*BA 279/U
	*BA 280/U

*Those marked with an asterisk are cold weather type and give best results when kept away from a warm place. The batteries on the above list which are not marked with an asterisk give best results when kept out of the extreme cold weather and should therefore be inside a bunker. (Command Report - 25th Inf Div - Nov 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 7

COMMUNICATIONS LESSONS. - The use of relays, necessary in Korea, caused a drain on radio equipment and personnel to operate them. Continued use of an FM net also causes a strain on dynamotors and poses a maintenance problem. More personnel are needed to maintain and operate this equipment. One solution might be the authorization of spare dynamotors for each radio set which can be easily and readily replaced by untrained personnel. A tank battalion operating with an infantry division, operates on extended frontages and special consideration should be given to this matter. The SCR 506 should be authorized for each line company, to insure communication at the extended ranges mentioned above.

Recommend that two operators per set be authorized. This authorization would relieve the strain on the FM sets during extensive operation. The use of enemy direction finding equipment poses a problem and requires a careful selection of our radio sites, but the speed-up of message traffic due to its longer range would overshadow his ability to locate. (Command Report - IX Corps - Oct 52)

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ITEM NO 8

EFFICIENCY OF TANK-MOUNTED BULLDOZERS. - Comments from tank unit commanders in Korea pertaining to the efficiency of tank-mounted bulldozers in all types of terrain follow:

- a. As now constructed, the tank dozer is too unwieldy, due to its length and weight.
- b. The tank is marginally powered and therefore does not have the extra power required to perform as a dozer.
- c. The tank dozer lacks maneuverability in tight spots and in many cases is road-bound due to poor terrain trafficability.
- d. It has poor operator vision to the front and it is virtually impossible for the driver to see to either side.
- e. Tank dozer will mire, due to its weight, in terrain that an engineer vehicle such as the D-7 dozer will negotiate with ease.
- f. Its low blade places definite restrictions on its movement, and is a hindrance to the company when operating on Korean terrain, since the low blade precludes the crossing of terraced rice paddies, dikes, irrigation ditches and walled up defense. This restriction on the dozer's movement results in a definite loss of fire power for the tank company. It also prevents the tactical use of tanks of company headquarters section, on which the blades are usually mounted.
- g. Due to its poor visibility, it is necessary to dismount a man to direct the driver during dozing operations.
- h. It is impossible to back-drag with the tank dozer due to the blade arms being set too low.
- i. It is impossible to angle-doze or undercut with the tank dozer.
- j. Tubes and cylinders of the pressure system are exposed and too easily damaged by rocks, terrain, and enemy fire.

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k. The tank dozer has its blade too close to the track for proper track adjustment. It is virtually impossible to adjust properly the track adjusting idler.

l. The maintenance of the tank dozer is excessive and requires much care. In dozing operations, in spite of extreme care being taken, there is a tendency for the transmission to burn up. The maintenance of this piece of equipment places a burden on all echelons of maintenance.

m. The tank dozer becomes almost helpless in muddy terrain due to its low blade and weight. It is practically impossible to pull this vehicle forward when mired down.

n. Dozing operations with the tank dozer has been the cause of torsion bar failure, and breaking of front shock absorbers. Track play, in addition, is responsible for the sheering of the compensating idler place where it is bolted to the hull.

Recommend that D-7 bulldozers be issued to tank battalions.
(Command Report - Eighth Army - Sep 52)

/OCAFF Comment: Improved tank-mounted dozers are under development. /

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 9

TRUCKS AS PRIME MOVERS FOR 155-MM HOWITZERS. - One battery of the battalion is now equipped with 4-ton trucks which has alleviated some of the troubles of movement. However, it was found that the bumperettes on the rear of the 4-ton truck increased the turning radius of the truck and howitzer. Such bumperettes have been removed or modified so that the truck can maneuver the piece through sharper turns and over more difficult terrain. The turning radius and the high silhouette of the truck impose a restriction upon the driver when maneuvering the howitzer into difficult positions. A pintle is placed on the front bumper of all 4-ton trucks used as prime movers to assist the driver in maneuvering the howitzer into position. (Command Report - 31st FA Bn - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 10

CALIBRATION AND POWDER LOTS FOR HEAVY ARTILLERY. - More frequent calibration by ordnance of the 155-mm gun is needed. The

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frequency of the present calibration, once every six months, cannot keep pace with the wear and changing of tubes.

An immediate solution to clearing powder lots for firing in the 155-mm gun is essential. Either sufficient numbers of lots should be tested and cleared for firing to sustain for several months, or a more efficient method of testing tubes for withstanding the pressure of unstable lots should be evolved and used. (Command Report - 145th FA Bn - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 11

USE OF SEARCHLIGHTS FOR BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION. -

A detailed experiment was made with battlefield illumination. Coordinating observers were at the OP's, the light direction center and the lights. Among the lessons learned was the use of a varied, intermittent schedule of off and on periods, which causes the enemy harassment and surprise as well as cooling the easily-overheated carbons and generators. This has since been made standard practice with appreciable maintenance-load reduction. (Command Report - 39th FA Bn - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 12

USE OF LIGHT AIRCRAFT. - Night operations of division air sections can be greatly expanded. The proven ability of L-20 aircraft to carry 40 M-6 illumination flares (L-19 can carry 14) gives the division an improved method of providing illumination of the battlefield. This is essential to supplement searchlights and reach defiladed areas in rugged terrain. It is more effective and less expensive than the use of illuminating artillery shells. Night reconnaissance by division light aircraft is highly effective. Enemy vehicular traffic halts in the presence of our low flying reconnaissance planes. Accurate observations far exceed what would be expected due to the intimate knowledge of the sector acquired by our pilots. Evacuation by army helicopters (H-13) at night is highly effective. With two litter-bearing Division helicopters, nine seriously wounded casualties have been successfully evacuated during four nights of heavy fighting. (Command Report - 7th Inf Div - Mar 53)

OCAFF Comment: Currently under evaluation by OCAFF are communications, electronics, and navigational aids to enable Army aircraft to operate in darkness and instrument weather conditions. 7

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ITEM NO 13

LIGHT AIRCRAFT PHOTOGRAPHIC MODIFICATION. - Recommend that Army aircraft organic to the infantry division be modified and additional photographic equipment authorized in order to improve air photo reconnaissance operations.

Light aircraft are very susceptible to wind currents causing drift from the desired line of flight. This prevents the overlap of successive photos required to obtain photo intelligence. A vari-focal viewfinder is needed to enable the pilot to make constant checks and corrections of his line of flight. This item should be added to the infantry division TBA.

To be of value, the camera and viewfinder must be free to rotate on both a vertical and horizontal axis. Existing aircraft should be modified to provide a Gimbal mounting for this purpose.

The speed potential for producing intelligence in the field is also hampered by inadequate training of army aviators and signal photographers for aerial reconnaissance photography. (Command Report - 40th Inf Div - Feb 53)

[OCAFF Comment: SR 95-400-5 limits aerial photography by Army aviation to that required for the purpose of locating, verifying and evaluating targets, adjusting fire, terrain study, or obtaining information on enemy forces not otherwise obtained by air reconnaissance agencies of other Services. Statements from the field, such as the above, assist this Office in studying requirements for equipment, training, and doctrine.]

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 14

QM BATH UNITS SOUGHT AS BRIDGE BUILDING EQUIPMENT. - Water heaters from QM portable bath units are required during the winter for furnishing approximately 1200 gallons of hot water per hour to be used in the manufacture of concrete. It is necessary to heat the water as well as the aggregates to a temperature of 70° Fahrenheit.

Because the capacity of one heater fulfills job requirements, one unit was issued; the second authorized unit was held in reserve for an emergency. The unit will be used in midstream of a river over which a permanent, high-level, reinforced concrete bridge is to be built.

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Construction of boilers on the river bank was considered impracticable because the water would cool too rapidly to reach the mixers at a suitable temperature. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Nov 52)

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ITEM NO 15

OVERHEAD COVER FOR M-39 CARRIER. - The infantry needed protection from enemy fire while proceeding to and from the objective in the M-39 carriers. Therefore overhead covers consisting of wooden beams and sandbags were constructed on the carriers. Angle iron beams, used as struts, supported crossbeams to be used for overhead cover, over the passenger wells of the vehicles. On top of the crossbeams were several layers of sandbags. (Historical Manuscript - Military History Detachment - Jan 53)

[OCAFF Comment: The new armored vehicle, M-75 which will replace the M-39 carrier has overhead cover for the protection of troops.]

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 16

ARMOR EMPLOYMENT. - An important lesson learned is that tanks acting independently or in conjunction with the infantry can maneuver behind strongly held terrain features, inflict many enemy casualties, and cause much destruction to enemy positions.

The constant threat to the enemy of friendly tanks appearing or maneuvering in front of the MLR kept him off balance and guessing as to the true intent of friendly forces. The threat of aggressive tank units, both from stationary positions on the MLR and in properly coordinated and conducted tank-infantry raids, has proved the worth of tanks in Korea. The capability of organic tanks to counterattack quickly is a constant threat and deterrent to the enemy. (Command Report - 2d Inf Div - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 17

LACK OF CAPABLE COMPANY COMMANDERS. - The officer personnel situation was greatly aggravated by the loss of experienced and senior officers while the majority of replacements were second lieutenants. This results in young and relatively inexperienced officers being thrust into positions requiring extensive ability and background.

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This was particularly evident during our contact with the Commonwealth Division. Their company commanders were majors with ten to twelve years of experience while many of ours were first lieutenants with less than two years of commissioned service. The replacement system could operate in a manner that would furnish experienced officers down to the working level. It is a universal military axiom that the position of a combat company commander must be filled by a mature, experienced, level-headed, forceful officer. These attributes cannot be obtained from schools or within the period of a few short months in training camps. In this war, as in those of the past, the combat company commander is the ultimate executor of the doctrines of attack and defense. There is no substitute for an experienced company commander. (Command Report - 2d Inf Div - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 18

LEAKY RECOIL SEALS ON M-47 TANKS. - This has caused, on many occasions, the replacement of batteries. When the gun is in traveling position the recoil cylinder is directly over the batteries and recoil oil leaking on these batteries soon cause them to become unserviceable. In addition to being harmful to the batteries, it is impossible to keep the proper amount of recoil oil in the cylinders, thereby causing too frequent checks and refilling. The excessive leaking of recoil seals is caused by a manufacturer defect. (Command Report - 510th Tank Bn - CY 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 19

MODIFIED CARRIAGE FOR 4-12 PORTABLE ROCK CRUSHER. - The 4-12 Portable Rock Crusher is normally mounted on four steel wheels. This carriage limits the distance the crusher can be moved without loading on a vehicle. The short tongue makes backing and maneuvering with anything but a crawler tractor difficult. Experiment has verified that a more suitable mount can easily be adapted by mounting the crusher on a 2-1/2-ton, pole type trailer. An additional set of wheels was added to the trailer to give more bearing area because of the additional load and to give the modified unit more over-the-road stability. No modifications to either piece of equipment are necessary to mount the crusher on the trailer. The trailer mounted crusher has the following advantages over the conventional steel wheel mounting:

a. Crusher can be transported longer distances in less time without loading.

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b. Crusher can be moved short distances much easier and maneuvered into position with any vehicle because of the long tongue on a pole type trailer.

c. The added height given the crusher, materially increased the efficiency of the operation, since the increased elevation gave more working area to use shovels and chutes in the removal of the crushed rock from the area directly beneath the crusher jaws. (Command Report - 378th Engr Cmbt Bn - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 20

ENGINEER MAINTENANCE SUPPORT. - Engineer equipment maintenance support continues to be inadequate. At present, 25% of this battalion's engineer equipment is awaiting repair by engineer maintenance support units.

Of the thousands of electric caps used over the past 6 months, approximately 15% have failed to function. All defective caps have been the product of the DuPont Corporation.

Recommend that:

a. Higher headquarters be advised of deficiencies in engineer maintenance support.

b. A test of DuPont electric caps be undertaken to determine the validity of this unit's contention of malfunctioning and the causes therefor. (Command Report - 116th Engr Cmbt Bn - Mar 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 21

REGIMENTAL REST AND RECUPERATION. - This unit has operated a Rest and Recuperation center which has added much to the health and well-being of the men. This center is operated well in the rear of the regimental sector and affords each man an opportunity to be off the line for one day and night per month. In addition to showering and a complete change of clothing, the individual is afforded an opportunity to use APO, PX and Red Cross facilities. Daily chapel services are held. Entertainment, such as USO shows, nightly movies and athletics are provided. The men are allowed a full night's sleep and "sit-down" dining facilities. (Command Report - 180th Inf Regt - Feb 53)

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ITEM NO 22

MAINTAINING HIGH STATE OF COMBAT READINESS. - To maintain a high state of combat readiness while on the line, the alert during the hours of darkness was established at 75% with a 25% alert status from one hour after daylight until one hour before darkness. A schedule was established which has proven sound, whereby all officers and men on night alert sleep from immediately after breakfast until approximately 1130 hours. At noon, an administrative inspection is conducted by the appropriate echelon of command, to include squad leaders, to insure that all men are shaven, washed, and that sleeping bunkers have been thoroughly policed. After the noonday meal, these individuals are required to engage in some form of outdoor activity such as preparation or rehearsal for patrols, deepening trenches, improving positions, cleaning crew-served weapons, replenishing ammunition in fighting bunkers as well as cleaning individual weapons. Between 1700 hours and 1800 hours daily, a combat readiness inspection of the fighting positions is conducted by commanders. This inspection is made to insure that weapons are clean, ammunition is clean and available, grenades, pyrotechnics, range cards, final protective fire indicators and fire limit stakes are in place. (Command Report - 180th Inf Regt - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 23

DEFECTS IN M-41 TRUCK. - Serious defects were found in the steering mechanism on the 5-ton truck, M-41, built by the International Harvester Company. Of six vehicles issued, three have developed difficulties over a period of approximately five weeks. In addition, one was issued without several of the bolts required to fasten the rear springs to the rear axles. Installation of these bolts is initially a factory responsibility.

The power steering failed to function on one vehicle as it was climbing a mountain road, causing the vehicle to run off the road and over-turn. This malfunction has been attributed to the sticking of a valve in the hydraulic steering mechanism. The other two vehicles have developed leaks in the power steering mechanism including the complete rupture of one oil line fitting.

According to TM 9-837 issued with the vehicles, the tire pressure was stated as 70 pounds per square inch. A later oral notice received

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from Ordnance indicated that the tires installed on the vehicles at time of issue were a low pressure type requiring only 45 pounds per square inch.

The use of this overpressure may have contributed to the failures noted above; however, three of the vehicles have not exhibited these defects to date; one vehicle developed the defect subsequent to the reduction of the tire pressure.

In addition to the difficulties enumerated above, the mounting bolts for the spare tire have sheared off on two of the vehicles. (Command Report - 204th FA Bn - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 24

TEST OF LEADED FUEL IN FIRE UNITS. - The results of tests conducted on fire units in messes operated by Eighth Army indicated that fire units were not adversely affected by the use of leaded fuel. (Command Report - Eighth Army - Nov 52)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 25

DENTAL POR WEAKNESS. - At the Replacement Company, 1413 patients, all newly arrived replacements, received dental care. Of these, 486 were in Dental Class 3, 4, or 5 and should not have left the CONUS without treatment. After patients were treated only 144 patients remained in Classes 3 and 4. The dental service is operating at only about 85% of its T/O&E strength and even at full strength would be overburdened. The solution lies in more efficient processing prior to departure from CONUS. (Command Report - 2d Inf Div - Feb 53)

OCAFF Comment: For other extracts on this subject see Source No 761, inclosure to letter, ATTNG-26 350.05/7(DOCI)(C)(3 Jun 53), OCAFF, 3 June 1953; Source No 743, inclosure to letter, ATTNG-26 350.05/6(DOCI)(C)(18 May 53), OCAFF, 18 May 1953, subject: "Dissemination of Combat Information;" and Item 26, this inclosure. 7

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ITEM NO 26

DENTAL SURVEYS. - Recent dental survey of newly incoming personnel in the division, indicate that a substantial number of these personnel have dental deficiencies in classes 3, 4, and 5 which existed prior to their leaving the continental US.

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Recommend that home stations defer shipment of personnel to this theater until dental deficiencies are corrected in accordance with current Army directives. (Command Report - 120th Med Bn - May 53)

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ITEM NO 27

AW PLATOON FDC. - Platoon fire direction centers controlling indirect fire in support of infantry regiments were moved during the month into the FDC's of the direct support field artillery battalions. This arrangement indicated that:

- a. Better training and more efficient operation of quad 50 computers resulted from direct supervision by trained field artillery fire direction personnel;
- b. More effective employment of quad 50 indirect fires resulted from the closer liaison and coordination possible. (Command Report - 145th AAA Bn - Feb 53)

(RESTRICTED)

ITEM NO 28

INFANTRY OFFICERS IN 4.2-INCH MORTAR BN. - The officers assigned to this Battalion during the past 60 days have been second lieutenants, who have had little or no training in 4.2-inch mortar operations or kindred subjects. They have only a general understanding of forward observer technique. It is extremely important that replacement officers assigned to a unit committed to combat be qualified to fight the basic weapon of the unit prior to joining said unit. Recommend that each officer assigned to a 4.2-inch mortar unit be qualified by either:

- a. Practical experience in an active 4.2-inch mortar unit or:
- b. Six weeks course in 4.2-inch mortar operations (Chemical Corps School or The Infantry School). (Command Report - 461st Inf Bn (Hv Mort) - Mar 53)

OCAFF Comment: Letter, ATTNG-32 352/21(Inf Sch)(14 Apr 53), OCAFF, 14 April 1953, subject: "Announcement of Infantry Heavy Mortar Officer Course," offers training for officers to qualify them as Fire Direction Officers (MOS 1188). Proper assignment of graduates of this course should rectify difficulties stated above.7

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